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1 Introduction
Decisions on some activities, such as consumption, saving and work, are made
individually while decisions on other activities, such as production and policy,
are made collectively. In case of perfectly competitive and complete markets,
the outcome of each type of decision has a positive impact on the outcome
of the other type: (1) utility maximization results in equal marginal rates of
substitution across consumers so shareholders agree unanimously on profit
maximization as the right objective for collective decision making; and, (2)
profit maximization results in the maximal dividends to shareholders making
the outcome Pareto optimal.
However, in case of perfectly competitive markets and direct external-
ities between firms none of these two properties hold: (1) equalization of
marginal rates of substitution does not make the shareholders agree on profit
maximization; and on top of that, (2) the outcome of firm by firm profit
maximization is typically not Pareto optimal. In order to understand why
shareholders disagree with profit maximization, consider at one extreme a
consumer with shares in only one firm: she wants that firm to maximize
its profit irrespectively of the impact on profits of other firms, correspond-
ing to no internalization. At the other extreme, consider a consumer with
a fraction of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is the sum of
portfolios of all shareholders: she wants every firm to maximize aggregate
profit1, corresponding to perfect internalization.
The argument is illustrated in Hansen & Lott (1996). Indeed they empha-
size that, besides the traditional benefits of risk reduction, portfolio diversifi-
cation offers additional benefits for shareholders through helping internalize
externalities. Investigating cross-ownership of stocks by institutions and do-
mestic mutual funds in the computer and automobile industries, they provide
evidence that externalities exist and shareholders are well diversified.
1In models with representative consumers such as most macroeconomic models as well
as all models with agents having some fraction of the market portfolio such as the CAPM
model of finance, all shareholders agree that the aggregate profit should be maximized.
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Hence for perfectly competitive markets and direct externalities between
firms there is a genuine social choice problem in every firm as well as a gen-
uine problem with efficiency in the economy. We study how these problems
can be solved through majority voting in firms. In equilibrium consumers
maximize utilities subject to budget constraints, production plans in firms
are stable with respect to majority voting and markets clear. Our main find-
ings are the following: (1) in terms of behavior of firms, voting is equivalent
to maximizing weigted sums of profits with weights being in the intersection
of the convex hulls of portfolios of majorities of voters; (2) equilibria exist
provided the rate of majority is at least max{q/(q + 1), (n− 1)/n}, where n
is the number of firms and q is the dimension of the production set; and, (3)
perfect internalization of externalities can be the outcome of voting in case
the market portfolio is in the intersection of the convex hulls of portfolios of
majorities of voters.
Two governances are considered: the shareholder governance (one share,
one vote); and, the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), where
all consumers are allowed to vote in all firms. The performance of the two
governances is compared with respect to aggregation of preferences and mar-
ket efficiency.
In general, for the shareholder governance a majority of shareholders in
some firm tends to have more shares in that firm than in some other firm,
so they put “too much” weight on the profit of that firm when voting over
production plans in that firm. Therefore perfect internalization is typically
not the outcome of voting for the shareholder governance. In the stakeholder
democracy, majorities in one firm are also majorities all other firms. There-
fore perfect internalization can be the outcome of voting for the stakeholder
democracy. At first sight the stakeholder democracy appears unrealistic.
However, public regulation in democracies can be seen as a proxy of the
stakeholder democracy.
The decision making in firms in case of market failures has received some
attention for quite many years. One strand of research has focused on the
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link between equilibrium and (constrained) Pareto optimality. Contributions
include Dre`ze (1974) and Grossman & Hart (1979), who emphasize the role
of the mean shareholder, or the mean gradient of the shareholders to be more
precise, in the context of incomplete financial markets. In Dre`ze (1985) and
Dierker & Dierker (2010) the role of the control group is emphasized. In
Dierker & Grodal (1999), Bejan (2008), Bejan & Bidian (2010) and Magill,
Quinzii & Rochet (2010) among others imperfect competition is considered.
In particular Bejan (2008) and Bejan & Bidian (2010) consider properties of
equilibria where firms maximize the wealth of shareholders.
Another strand of research has focused on majority voting. Contributions
include DeMarzo (1993), who emphasizes the role of the dominant share-
holder, Gevers (1974), Kelsey & Milne (1996), Ritzberger (2005), Tvede &
Cre`s (2005), Cre`s (2008) and Demichelis & Ritzberger (2011). In Tvede &
Cre`s (2005) multidimensional median voter/shareholder theorems a` la Green-
berg (1979) are obtained. In the present paper we bridge the two strands
of research: equilibria are based on majority voting; and, the link between
equilibrium and optimality is studied.
The problems arising in the governance of firms because of incomplete
markets or imperfect competition are ultimately problems of (indirect) exter-
nalities. In case of imperfect competition, decisions on production plans im-
pact shareholders through income and prices and consumers through prices.
In case of incomplete markets, decisions on production plans impact share-
holders through income and spanning and consumers through spanning. In
contrast with the cases of incomplete markets and imperfect competition,
the case of direct production externalities makes it possible to fully char-
acterize the relation between the behavior of firms and the distribution of
portfolios. Moreover the link between equilibrium and optimality becomes
transparent and directly related to the distribution of portfolios. Character-
izations parametrized by the distribution of portfolios rather than gradients
of consumers have the advantage of being based on available information as
can be seen in Hansen & Lott (1996).
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The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, the set-up including
definitions of equilibria and assumptions is presented; in Section 3 the results
are stated; and, in Section 4 some concluding remarks are offered.
2 The model
In the present section the economy is described and the notion of equilibrium
is introduced.
2.1 Set-up
Consider an economy with ` goods, m consumers and n firms. Markets are
perfectly competitive and there are direct externalities between firms. In
general perfect competition makes sense in case all agents are small relative
to the rest of the economy. In case of direct externalities between firms, both
production plans and externalities should be small for firms to be small.
Indeed actions in one firm should influence at most a few other firms a lot
or a lot of other firms a little.
Let p = (p1, . . . , p`), where pk ≥ 0 for all k, be a price vector. Price vectors
are normalized such that prices sum to one. Let S = {p ∈ R`+ |
∑
k pk = 1}
be the set of normalized prices.
Consumers are characterized by their identical consumption sets X = R`,
endowment vectors ωi ∈ R`, utility functions ui : X → R and portfolios
δi = (δi1, . . . , δin) where δij ≥ 0 for all i and j and
∑
i δij = 1 for all j. Let
en =
∑
i δi be the market portfolio, so e
n
j = 1 for all j. Consumption sets are
assumed to be unbounded from below to ensure that for all lists of individual
production plans, consumers are able to finance consumption plans in their
consumption sets. Since firms are not necessarily maximizing their profits,
the value of a firm can be negative.
There are direct externalities between firms: in every firm an action is
taken and the production plan of every firm depends on the actions taken in
all firms. Firms are described by their sets of action Aj ⊂ Rq and production
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functions fj : A → R`, where A =
∏
j′ Aj′ , such that yj = fj(a), where
a = (a1, . . . , an), is the production plan of firm j. Actions could include
choice of some inputs or outputs. As an example suppose firms choose inputs
while output in every firm depends on aggregate inputs: if Kj ≥ 0 is the input
of firm j, then the output of firm j is (
∑
j′ 6=jKj′)
αKβj as in Romer (1986).
Thus the approach in the present paper is in line with the approach used in
endogenous growth.
Traditionally in general equilibrium direct externalities between firms
are described by correspondences Yj : (R`)n−1 → R` such that if y−j =
(y1, . . . , yj−1, yj+1, . . . , yn) is a list of individual production plans for all firms
but firm j, then the production set of firm j is Yj(y−j). In the traditional
approach, a list of production plans y is an equilibrium for the production
sector if yj ∈ Yj(y−j) for all j and no y′j ∈ Yj(y−j) is more attractive than yj
for any j. Hence, in the traditional approach it is not taken into account that
if the production plan of firm j is changed, then the production set of firm
j′ is changed too. Consequently the production plan of firm j′ can become
impossible or more attractive production plans can become possible.
2.2 Demand, supply and equilibrium
The demand of every consumer is assumed to be small relative to the rest
of the economy and the portfolio of every consumer is assumed to be small
relative to the market portfolio en. Therefore consumers consider prices to
be fixed and suppose their votes have no impact on the decisions in the firms.
For a price vector p and a list of individual actions a the problem of consumer
i is
max
xi
ui(xi)
s.t. p · xi ≤ p · ωi +
∑
jδijp · fj(a).
Firms are assumed to be small relative to the rest of the economy. Hence
consumers consider the decisions in the firms to have no impact on prices.
Describing the decision process in firm j takes a few steps. For a price vector
p and a list of individual actions a let Pij(p, a) ⊂ Aj be the set of actions in
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firm j that make consumer i better off or equivalently wealthier
Pij(p, a) = {a′j ∈ Aj |
∑
j′δij′p · fj′(a′j, a−j) >
∑
j′δij′p · fj′(a)}.
For a price vector p, a list of individual actions a and another action a′j for
firm j let Mj(p, a, a
′
j) ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} be the set of consumers who are better
off with a′j than with aj
Mj(p, a, a
′
j) = { i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} |a′j ∈ Pij(p, a)}.
Let ρ ∈ [0, 1[ be the rate of majority needed to change actions in firms
and let θ = (θ1, . . . , θn), where θj = (θ1j, . . . , θmj), θij ≥ 0 and
∑
i θij = 1,
be the voting weights. For a price vector p, a list of actions a and another
action a′j for firm j, a change of actions from aj to a
′
j in firm j is adopted if
and only if ∑
i∈Mj(p,a,a′j)
θij > ρ.
Two cases of voting weights are considered: the shareholder governance where
θij = δij (one share, one vote); and, the stakeholder democracy where θij =
1/m (one stakeholder, one vote). For the shareholder governance consumer
i can vote in firm j if and only if δij > 0 and for the stakeholder democracy
all consumers can vote in all firms. However consumers without shares have
no interest in voting because they receive no dividends.
For a price vector p and a list of individual actions a, let Qρj (p, a) ⊂ Aj
be the set of actions preferred to aj in firm j in the sense that every action
in Qρj (p, a) is preferred to aj by some majority in firm j
Qρj (p, a) = {a′j ∈ Aj |
∑
i∈Mj(p,a,a′j)θij > ρ}.
For a price vector p and a list of individual actions a−j for all firms but firm
j the problem of firm j is to find stable actions, i.e., actions aj such that
Qρj (p, aj, a−j) = ∅.
In a ρ-majority stable equilibrium (or ρ-MSE) consumers maximize util-
ities, actions in firms are stable for unilateral changes and markets clear.
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Definition 1 A ρ-majority stable equilibrium is a price vector, a list of
individual consumption bundles and a list of individual actions (p¯, x¯, a¯) such
that:
(C) x¯i is a solution to the problem of consumer i given p¯ and a¯ for all i.
(F) a¯j is a solution to the problem of firm j given p¯ and a¯−j for all j
such that Qρj (p¯, a¯j, a¯−j) = ∅.
(E)
∑
i x¯i =
∑
i ωi +
∑
j fj(a¯).
Example: For ` = 1, m = 2 and n = 2 suppose that the portfolios are
δ1 = (1, 0) and δ2 = (0, 1), the set of actions A2 = A1 = [0, 1], and the
production functions f1(a1, a2) = 1− a1 + 2a2 and f2(a1, a2) = 1− a2 + 2a1.
Let ρ ∈ [0, 1[. Then for the shareholder governance there is a unique
ρ-MSE with a¯ = (a¯1, a¯2) = (0, 0). Indeed f1(a
′
1, a2) > f1(a) for all a with
a1 > 0 and a
′
1 < a1 so consumer 1 votes for a
′
1.
Let ρ ∈ [1/2, 1[. Then for the stakeholder democracy there is a continuum
of ρ-MSEs because for every pair of actions a = (a1, a2) there exists a ρ-MSE
with a¯ = a. Indeed for all a and a′1 with a
′
1 6= a1, if a′1 < a1, then f2(a′) <
f2(a) so consumer 2 votes against a
′
1 and if a
′
1 > a1, then f1(a
′) < f1(a) so
consumer 1 votes against a′1.
2.3 Multilateral changes of actions in firms
Consumers can typically vote in several firms: for the shareholder gover-
nance in all firms they have shares in; and, for the stakeholder governance
in all firms. Therefore multilateral changes of actions in firms, where voters
coordinate changes of actions in several firms, are considered. Perfectly com-
petitive markets make sense for multilateral changes of actions in case firms
can be partitioned into groups of firms such that externalities are restricted
to firms in the same groups and groups are small relative to the rest of the
economy. The partition of firms could reflect location, technology or other
characteristics.
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For multilateral changes of actions in firms the problem of the firm has
to be changed into a problem of the production sector. For a price vector p
and a list of individual actions a, let Pi(p, a) ⊂ A be the set of actions that
make consumer i better off or equivalently wealthier
Pi(p, a) = {a′ ∈ A |
∑
jδijp · fj(a′) >
∑
j′δijp · fj(a)}.
For a price vector p and a pair of lists of individual actions a and a′, let
M(p, a, a′) ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} be the set of consumers who are better off with a′
than with a
M(p, a, a′) = { i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} |a′ ∈ Pi(p, a)}.
For a change of actions from a to a′ the change is adopted if and only if∑
i∈M(p,a,a′)
θij > ρ
for all j with a′j 6= aj. For a price vector p and a list of individual actions a,
let Qρ(p, a) ⊂ A be the set of actions preferred to a in the sense that every
list of individual actions in Qρ(p, a) is preferred to a by majorities in all firms
where actions are changed
Qρ(p, a) = {a′ ∈ A |∑i∈M(p,a,a′)θij > ρ for all j with a′j 6= aj }.
For a price vector p the problem of the production sector is to find stable
actions a, i.e., actions a such that Qρ(p, a) = ∅.
In a strong ρ-MSE consumers maximize utilities, actions are stable for
multilateral changes and markets clear.
Definition 2 A strong ρ-majority stable equilibrium is a price vec-
tor, a list of individual consumption bundles and a list of individual actions
(p¯, x¯, a¯) such that:
(C) x¯i is a solution to the problem of consumer i given p¯ and a¯ for all i.
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(P) a¯ is a solution to the problem of the production sector given p¯ such
that Qρ(p¯, a¯) = ∅.
(E)
∑
i x¯i =
∑
i ωi +
∑
j fj(a¯).
For the shareholder governance economies need not have strong ρ-MSEs
because having a majority of the votes in one firm does not imply having a
majority of the votes in another firm as the following example shows.
Example: For ` = 1, m = 2 and n = 2 suppose the portfolios are δ1 = (1, 0)
and δ2 = (0, 1), the set of actions A2 = A1 = [0, 1], and the production
functions f1(a1, a2) = 1− a1 + 2a2 and f2(a1, a2) = 1− a2 + 2a1.
Let ρ ∈ [0, 1[. Then for the shareholder governance there is no strong
ρ-MSE: a = (a1, a2) with a1, a2 < 1 is not part of a strong ρ-MSE, because
f1(a
′) > f1(a) and f2(a′) > f2(a) for a′ = a+ (1−max{a1, a2})(1, 1) so both
consumers vote against a; and, a = (1, a2) is not part of a strong ρ-MSE,
because f1(a
′) > f1(a) for a′ = (0, a2) so consumer 1 votes against a.
Let ρ ∈ [1/2, 1[. Then for the stakeholder democracy there is a continuum
of strong ρ-MSEs: a = (a1, a2) is part of a strong ρ-MSE if and only if
a1 = 1 or a2 = 1. Indeed if a1 = 1 or a2 = 1, then f1(a
′) < f1(a) or
f2(a
′) < f2(a) for every a′ 6= a so one of the consumers votes against a′
and if both a1 < 1 and a2 < 1, then f1(a
′) > f1(a) and f2(a′) > f2(a) for
a′ = a+ (1−max{a1, a2})(1, 1), so both consumers vote against a.
2.4 Assumptions
Consumers are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.1) ui is continuous.
(A.2) ui is strongly monotone, so z
k
i ≥ xki for all k and zi 6= xi imply
ui(zi) > ui(xi), and quasi-concave, so ui((1−τ)xi+τzi) ≥ min{ui(xi), ui(zi)}
for all τ ∈ [0, 1].
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(A.3) The set u−1i (r) = {xi ∈ X |ui(x) = r } is bounded from below for all
r ∈ R.
All assumptions are standard.
Firms are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(A.4) Aj is convex and compact.
(A.5) fj is continuous.
(A.6) fj is concave, so f
k
j ((1 − τ)a + τa′) ≥ (1 − τ)fkj (a) + τfkj (a′) for all
k and τ ∈ [0, 1].
The assumptions ensure that the free disposal hull of the production set
{y ∈ R`n |∃a : ykj ≤ fkj (a) for all j and k }
is convex.
3 Results
In the present section results are presented and discussed.
3.1 Objectives of firms
Below it is shown that the outcome of voting over actions in firms can be
viewed as solutions to firms maximizing weighted sums of profits. The issue
is identification of the weights. Clearly, coalitions of voters with majorities of
votes are decisive in the process of choosing weights. Therefore the weights
are related to the portfolios of voters in these coalitions. Before stating the
results some notation is needed.
Let Λn−1+ be the unit simplex in Rn+
Λn−1+ = {λ ∈ Rn+ |
∑
jλj = 1}.
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For I = {1, . . . ,m} let Γ : 2I → Λn−1+ , where 2I is the set of all subsets of
I, be a correspondence that maps coalitions of consumers to convex hulls of
normalized portfolios
Γ(M) =
 {λ ∈ Λ
n−1
+ |∃α ∈ R|M |+ :
∑
i∈Mαiδi = λ} for
∑
i∈Mδi 6= 0
Λn−1+ for
∑
i∈Mδi = 0.
For the shareholder governance every coalition M with
∑
i∈M δij > ρ is de-
cisive in firm j. Let Iρj ⊂ 2I be the set of decisive coalitions so M ∈ Iρj if
and only if
∑
i∈M δij > ρ. For the stakeholder democracy every coalition M
with |M | > ρm is decisive in every firm. Let Iρ ⊂ 2I be the set of decisive
coalitions so M ∈ Iρ if and only if |M | > ρm.
For a finite set of vectors v1, . . . , vk let co{v1, . . . , vk} be the convex hull
of the vectors v1, . . . , vk.
The outcome of voting is equivalent to maximizing a weighted sum of
profits. Indeed for every decisive coalition there exist weights λM in the
convex hull of portfolios Γ(M) such that the outcome is equivalent to max-
imizing a weighted sum of profits for all weights in the convex hull of the
weights of the decisive coalitions co{λM}M .
Theorem 1 Consider an economy.
• Suppose (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium for the shareholder
governance. Then for all j and M ∈ Iρj there exists λjM ∈ Γ(M) such
that a¯j maximizes
∑
j′ λ
j
j′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j) for all λj ∈ co{λjM}M∈Iρj .
• Suppose (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium for the stakeholder
democracy. Then for all j and M ∈ Iρ there exists λjM ∈ Γ(M) such
that a¯j maximizes
∑
j′ λ
j
j′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j) for all λj ∈ co{λjM}M∈Iρ.
• Suppose (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a strong ρ-majority stable equilibrium for the stake-
holder democracy. Then for all M ∈ Iρ there exists λjM ∈ Γ(M) such
that a¯ maximizes
∑
j′ λj′ p¯ · fj′(a) for all λ ∈ co{λjM}M∈Iρ.
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Proof: The proof is by contradiction. For the shareholder governance suppose
(p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE and there exist j and M ∈ Iρj such that a¯j does not
maximize
∑
j′ λj
′p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j) for any λ ∈ Γ(M).
According to Theorem 21.1 in Rockafellar (1970) either: (1) there exists
aj ∈ Aj such that∑
j′
δij′ p¯ · (fj′(a¯j, a¯−j)− fj′(aj, a¯−j)) < 0
for all i ∈ M ; or alternatively, (2) there exists (αi)i, where αi ≥ 0 for all
i ∈M and ∑i αi > 0, such that∑
i
αi
∑
j′
δij′ p¯ · (fj′(a¯j, a¯−j)− fj′(aj, a¯−j)) ≥ 0
for all aj ∈ Aj.
Suppose aj ∈ Aj is a solution to (1), then aj ∈ Qρj (p¯, a¯). This contradicts
that (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE.
Suppose (αi)i, where αi ≥ 0 for all i and
∑
i αi > 0, is a solution to (2),
then a¯j maximizes
∑
j′ α
′
j′ p¯ ·fj′(aj, a¯−j) for α′ =
∑
i αiδi, but this contradicts
that a¯j does not maximize
∑
j′ λj
′p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j) for any λ ∈ Γ(M).
Suppose for all j and M ∈ Iρj there exists λjM such that a¯j maximizes∑
j′ λ
j
Mj′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j). Then clearly a¯j maximizes
∑
j′ λ
j
j′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j) for
all λj ∈ co{λjM}M∈Iρj .
The proofs for the stakeholder democracy are identical to the proof for
the shareholder governance.
Q.E.D.
For a ρ-MSE or a strong ρ-MSE (p¯, x¯, a¯) assume the sets of actions are
smooth manifolds with boundary, the production functions are differentiable
and the n× q-matrix of derivatives of profits p¯
TDajf1(a¯)
...
p¯TDajfn(a¯)

13
has rank n for all j. Then the outcome of voting is equivalent to maximizing
a weighted sum of profits for weights being in the intersection of the convex
hulls of portfolios of decisive coalitions ∩MΓ(M).
Corollary 1 Assume Aj is a smooth q-dimensional manifold with boundary
and fj : A → R` is a differentiable function for all j. For (p¯, a¯) assume the
n× q-matrix  p¯
TDajf1(a¯)
...
p¯TDajfn(a¯)

has rank n for every j.
• Suppose (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium for the shareholder
governance. Then for all j there exists λj ∈ ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M) such that a¯j
maximizes
∑
j′ λ
j
j′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j).
• Suppose (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium for the stakeholder
democracy. Then for all j there exists λj ∈ ∩M∈IρΓ(M) such that a¯j
maximizes
∑
j′ λ
j
j′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j).
• Suppose (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a strong ρ-majority stable equilibrium for the stake-
holder democracy. Then there exists λ ∈ ∩M∈IρΓ(M) such that a¯ max-
imizes
∑
j′ λj′ p¯ · fj′(a).
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. For the shareholder governance suppose
(p¯, x¯, q¯) is a ρ-MSE and there exists j such that ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M) = ∅ or a¯j does
not maximize
∑
j′ λj′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j) for any λ ∈ ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M).
It follows from Theorem 1 that if (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE, then for all j
and M ∈ Iρj , there exists λjM ∈ Γ(M) such that a¯j maximizes
∑
j′ λMj′ p¯ ·
fj′(aj, a¯−j). Therefore suppose there exist M,M ′ ∈ Iρj and λ ∈ Γ(M) and
λ′ ∈ Γ(M ′), where λ′ 6= λ, such that a¯j maximizes both
∑
j′ λj′p · fj′(aj, a¯−j)
and
∑
j′ λ
′
j′p · fj′(aj, a¯−j).
By assumption if a¯j is in the interior of Aj, then a¯j + ∆aj ∈ Aj provided
∆aj is sufficiently small. If a¯j is in the boundary of Aj, then there exists
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v 6= 0 such that for all ∆aj ∈ Rq with ∆aj 6= 0, if v · ∆aj ≤ 0, then there
exists a sequence (∆akj )k∈N, where limk→∞ ‖∆akj‖ = 0 and
lim
k→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1‖∆akj‖∆akj − 1‖∆aj‖∆aj
∥∥∥∥∥ = 0,
such that a¯j + ∆a
k
j ∈ Aj for all k.
Let v = 0 in case a¯j is in the interior of Aj. Then a¯j maximizing∑
j′ λj′p
Tfj′(aj, a¯−j) implies there is no solution to
(
∑
j′ λj′p
TDajfj′(a¯j, a¯−j)) ·∆aj > 0
v ·∆aj < 0
(1)
and a¯j maximizing
∑
j′ λ
′
j′p
Tfj′(aj, a¯−j) implies there is no solution to
(
∑
j′ λ
′
j′p
TDajfj′(a¯j, a¯−j)) ·∆aj > 0
v ·∆aj < 0.
(2)
The two vectors
∑
j′ λj′p
TDajfj′(a¯j, a¯−j) and
∑
j′ λ
′
j′p
TDajfj′(a¯j, a¯−j) are
not collinear because by assumption the n× q-matrix p¯
TDajf1(a¯)
...
p¯TDajfn(a¯)

has rank n for every j and λ and λ′ are not collinear. Hence there ex-
ists a solution to (1) or (2), but this contradicts that a¯j maximizes both∑
j′ λj′p
Tfj′(aj, a¯−j) and
∑
j′ λ
′
j′p
Tfj′(aj, a¯−j). Thus (p¯, x¯, a¯) is not a ρ-MSE.
The proofs for the stakeholder democracy are identical to the proof for
the shareholder governance.
Q.E.D.
A list of individual actions a is productively efficient if and only if there
does not exist another list of individual actions a′ such that fkj (a
′) ≥ fkj (a)
for all j and k and f(a′) 6= f(a). As far as productive efficiency of actions
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is concerned, the stakeholder democracy is likely to perform better than the
shareholder governance. For the shareholder governance, suppose that there
exist firms j and j′ such that (∩M∈Iρj Γ(M)) ∩ (∩M ′∈Iρj′Γ(M
′)) = ∅. Then
the outcome of the production sector is productively inefficient because firms
are maximizing weighted sums of profits using different weights. For the
stakeholder democracy, the outcome of the production sector can be pro-
ductively efficient because firms can be maximizing weighted sums of profits
using identical weights (assuming ∩M∈IρΓ(M) ∩ Rn++ 6= ∅). Moreover the
outcome of the production sector is productively efficient in strong ρ-MSEs
(assuming ∩M∈IρΓ(M) ⊂ Rn++) because firms are using identical weights.
3.2 Existence of equilibrium
Consider a society consisting of some individuals who must choose an alter-
native from a set of alternatives. Suppose the set of alternatives is compact
and convex and has dimension k and individuals have convex and continuous
preferences. Then, as shown in Greenberg (1979), there exists a majority
stable equilibrium provided the rate of majority is at least k/(k + 1).
In the present paper the conflicts between voters on the objectives of firms
can be formulated as conflicts over actions or conflicts over relative weights
on profits in firms. For ρ-MSEs the dimension of the set of actions Aj is q
and the dimension of the set of relative weights Λn−1+ is n − 1. For strong
ρ-MSEs the dimension of the set of actions A is qn and the dimension of the
set of relative weights Λn−1+ is n− 1.
Theorem 2 Consider an economy.
• Suppose
ρ ≥ min
{
q
q + 1
,
n− 1
n
}
.
Then there exist ρ-majority stable equilibria for both governances.
• Suppose
ρ ≥ n− 1
n
.
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Then there exist strong ρ-majority stable equilibria for the stakeholder
democracy.
The bound on the rate of majority in Theorem 2 is very high even for
economies with few firms, but the bound is binding. Indeed as the following
example shows, there exists an economy such that if the rate of majority is
lower than the bound, then the economy does not have a ρ-MSE. However
in Section 4 it is discussed how the bound can be lowered to 1− 1/e ≈ 0.64
or even 0.5 for some classes of distributions of portfolios.
Example: For ` = 1 and n = m suppose consumer i is the sole owner of firm
j = i and has 1/m of the shares in firm j = m for i < m and consumer i
has 1/m of the shares in firm j = m for i = m and the rate of majority is
ρ < (n − 1)/n. Suppose Aj = Λn−1+ for all j and the production functions
are fj(am, a−m) = amj for all j so output in every firm only depends on the
action of firm m.
Let ρ < q/(q + 1) = (n − 1)/n. If amj > 0, then all consumers but
consumer i = j are better off with a′m where a
′
mj′ = amj′ + amj/(m − 1) for
all j′ 6= j and a′mj′ = 0 for j′ = j. Therefore for all am ∈ Am it is possible to
make at least n− 1 out of n consumers better off. Hence there is no ρ-MSE
for neither the shareholder governance nor the stakeholder democracy.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
For ρ-MSEs under the shareholder governance the proof consists of two parts:
min{q/(q + 1), (n − 1)/n} = q/(q + 1); and, min{q/(q + 1), (n − 1)/n} =
(n − 1)/n. In the first part the conflict between shareholders in firm j is
over actions. The first part is a straightforward application of the theorem
in Shafer & Sonnenschein (1975) or Corollary A.1 in Won & Yannelis (2008).
Alternatively In the second part the conflict between shareholders in firm j is
over weights on profits. The second part consists of two steps: first artificial
equilibria are introduced and shown to be equivalent to ρ-MSEs; and, second
existence of artificial equilibria is established.
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The proof for ρ-MSEs under the stakeholder democracy is identical to the
proof for the shareholder governance. The proof for strong ρ-MSEs under
the stakeholder democracy is identical to the second part of the proof for the
shareholder governance.
The min{q/(q + 1), (n− 1)/n} = q/(q + 1) part
Assume ρ ≥ q/(q + 1). Then Qρj has open graph and aj /∈ coQρj (p, a) for all
(p, a) according to the proof of Theorem 2 in Greenberg (1979).
Let vL, vU ∈ R` be such that if a ∈ A, then vkL < fkj (a) < vkU for all j and
k. Let wL ∈ R` be such that if ui(xi) ≥ ui(ωi +
∑
j δijvL), then x
k
i > w
k
L for
all i and k. Let the truncated consumption set XT ⊂ R` be defined by
XT = {x ∈ X |wkL ≤ xk ≤
∑
iω
k
i + nv
k
U − (m− 1)wkL for all k }.
Let the budget correspondence Ci : S × A→ XT be defined by
Ci(p, a) = {x′i ∈ XT |p · x′i ≤ p · ωi +
∑
jδijfj(a)}.
Then Ci is continuous with non-empty, convex and compact values. Let the
preference correspondence Qi : X
T → XT be defined by
Qi(xi) = {x′i ∈ XT |ui(x′i) > ui(xi)}.
Then Qi has open graph with convex values and xi /∈ Qi(xi) for all xi.
Let the preference correspondence of the auctioneer Q0 : S×(XT )m×A→
S be defined by
Q0(p, x, a) = {p′ ∈ S |p′ · (
∑
ixi −
∑
iωi −
∑
jfj(a))
> p · (∑ixi −∑iωi −∑jfj(a))}.
Then Q0 has open graph with convex values and p /∈ Q0(p, x, a) for all
(p, x, a).
According to the theorem in Shafer & Sonnenschein (1975) or Corollary
A.1 in Won & Yannelis (2008) there exists (p¯, x¯, a¯) ∈ S × (XT )m × A such
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that x¯i ∈ Ci(p¯, a¯) and Qi(x¯i) ∩ Ci(p¯, a¯) = ∅ for all i, Qρj (p¯, a¯) = ∅ for all j
and Q0(p¯, x¯, a¯) = ∅.
Next it is shown that an equilibrium of the truncated economy is a ρ-MSE
of the original economy. Suppose p¯k = 0 for some k, then x¯
k
i =
∑
i′ ω
k
i′ +
nvkU − (m−1)wkL for all i because ui is strongly monotone for all i. Therefore∑
i x¯
k
i >
∑
i ω
k
i +
∑
j f
k
j (a¯) because∑
i
x¯ki −
∑
i
ωki −
∑
j
fkj (a¯)
= (m− 1)
∑
i
(ωi +
∑
j
δijv
k
U − wkL) +
∑
j
(vkU − fkj (a¯))
> (m− 1)
∑
i
(ωi +
∑
j
δijv
k
L − wkL) +
∑
j
(vkU − fkj (a¯))
Hence
∑
i x¯
k′
i >
∑
i ω
k′
i +
∑
j f
k′
j (a¯) for all k
′ because Q0(p¯, x¯, a¯) = ∅. Thus
there exists i such that p¯ · x¯i > p¯ · ωi +
∑
j δij p¯ · fj(a¯), but this contradicts
that x¯i ∈ Ci(p¯, a¯). All in all, p¯k > 0 for all k.
Condition (E) in Definition 1 is satisfied because Q0(p¯, x¯, a¯) = ∅ and
p¯k > 0 for all k imply
∑
i x¯
k
i =
∑
i ω
k
i +
∑
j f
k
j (a¯) for all k. Condition (F) in
Definition 1 is satisfied because Qρj (p¯, a¯) = ∅ for all j. It takes a few steps to
show that condition (C) in Definition 1 is satisfied. Firstly x¯ki > w
k
L because
ωki +
∑
j δijf
k
j (a¯) > ω
k
i +nv
k
L for all k. Secondly x¯
k
i <
∑
i′ ω
k
i′+nv
k
U−(m−1)wkL
for all i and k because x¯ki′ > w
k
L for all i
′ and k, fj(a¯) < vkU for all j and k and∑
i x¯i =
∑
i ωi+
∑
j fj(a¯). Thirdly if ui(xi) > ui(x¯i), then ui((1−τ)xi+τ x¯i) >
ui(x¯i) for all τ ∈]0, 1]. Indeed if there exists τ¯ ∈]0, 1[ such that ui((1− τ¯)xi+
τ¯ x¯i) = ui(x¯i), then for e
` ∈ R` being the vector with all coordinates equal to
one there exists ε > 0 such that ui(xi−εe`) > ui(x¯i), because ui is continuous,
and ui((1− τ¯)(xi+εe`)+ τ¯ x¯i) < ui(x¯i), because ui is strongly monotone, but
this contradicts that ui is quasi-concave. Therefore if there exists xi ∈ X
such that ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) and p¯ ·xi ≤ p¯ ·ωi +
∑
j δij p¯ · fj(a¯), then there exists
x′i ∈ XT such that ui(x′i) > ui(x¯i) and p¯ · x′i ≤ p¯ · ωi +
∑
j δij p¯ · fj(a¯). Hence
x¯i ∈ Ci(p¯, a¯) and Qi(x¯i) ∩ Ci(p¯, a¯) = ∅ for all i imply that condition (C) in
Definition 1 is satisfied. All in all, (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE.
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Artificial economies
Following Tvede & Cre`s (2005) an artificial economy is used. The problem
of a firm is decomposed into a problem of selecting a price vector for profit
maximization and a problem of maximizing profit.
Describing the problem of selecting a price vector takes a few steps. Let
Mδ 6=0 ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} be the set of consumers with shares in some firm
Mδ 6=0 = { i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} |δi 6= 0}.
Then Γ({i}) ∈ Λn+ is the normalized portfolio of consumer i. For i ∈ Mδ 6=0
let the function φi : S → Λ`n−1 be defined by
φi(p) =
 φ
i
1(p)
...
φin(p)
 =
 Γ1({i})p...
Γn({i})p
 .
Then φi(p) is the ideal point of consumer i in the sense that consumer i wants
firm j to maximize
∑
j′ φ
i
j′(p) · fj′(aj, a−j) for every j.
For every i ∈ Mδ 6=0 let the correspondence Vi : S × Λ`n−1 → Λ`n−1
associate every price vector p in S and vector µ in Λ`n−1 with the set of
vectors µ′ in Λ`n−1 closer to φi(p) than µ
Vi(p, µ) = {µ′ ∈ Λ`n−1 |
∑
j‖µ′j − φij(p)‖2 <
∑
j‖µj − φij(p)‖2 }.
Let the correspondence N : S ×Λ`n−1 ×Λ`n−1 →Mδ 6=0 associate every price
vector p in S and pair of vectors µ and µ′ in Λ`n−1 with the set of consumers
with µ′ ∈ Vi(p, µ)
N(p, µ, µ′) = { i ∈Mδ 6=0 |µ′ ∈ Vi(p, µ)}.
Let the correspondence W ρj : S ×Λ`n−1 → Λ`n−1 associate every price vector
p and vector µ in Λ`n−1 with the set of vectors µ′ in Λ`n−1 closer to φi(p)
than µ for a majority of consumers
W ρj (p, µ) = {µ′ ∈ Λ`n−1 |
∑
i∈N(p,µ,µ′)θij > ρ}.
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Definition 3 An artificial equilibrium is a list of individual vectors, a
price vector, a list of individual consumption bundles and a list of individual
actions (µ¯, p¯, x¯, a¯), where µ¯ = (µ¯1, . . . , µ¯n) and µ¯j ∈ Λ`n−1 for all j, such
that:
(C) x¯i is a solution to the problem of consumer i given p¯ and a¯ for all i.
(F’) a¯j maximizes the profit of firm j given µ¯j and a¯−j, so a¯j is a solution
to
max
aj
∑
j′
µ¯j
′
j · fj′(aj, a¯−j)
s.t. aj ∈ Aj.
(F”) W ρj (p¯, µ¯j) = ∅.
(E)
∑
i x¯i =
∑
i ωi +
∑
j fj(a¯).
The problems of the firms (F’) and (F”) in Definition 3 are artificial in the
sense that they are not related to the preferences of the consumers. However
as shown in Lemma 1 if (µ¯, p¯, x¯, a¯) is an artificial equilibrium, then (p¯, x¯, a¯)
is a ρ-MSE.
Lemma 1 Suppose (µ¯, p¯, x¯, a¯) is an artificial equilibrium, then (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a
ρ-majority stable equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose (µ¯, p¯, x¯, a¯) is an artificial equilibrium. Then (C) and (E) are
satisfied. Therefore it suffice to show that (F) is satisfied. The strategy of
the proof is to show that if Qρj (p¯, a¯) 6= ∅, then W ρj (p¯, µ¯) 6= ∅.
Suppose Qρj (p¯, a¯) 6= ∅, then there exists aj ∈ Aj such that∑
i∈Mj(p¯,a¯,aj)
θij > ρ.
Let y¯j′ = fj′(a¯) and yj′ = fj′(aj, a¯−j) for all j′, then∑
j′
µ¯j
′
j · (yj′ − y¯j′) ≤ 0
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and ∑
j′
φij′(p¯) · (yj′ − y¯j′) > 0
for all i ∈Mj(p¯, a¯, aj).
Let µj ∈ Λ`n−1 be defined by
µj = µ¯j + τ

 y1 − y¯1...
yn − y¯n
− ∑j′(ykj′ − y¯kj′) · e
`n
 e...
e

 .
Then tedious and straightforward calculations show that µj ∈ Vi(p¯, µ¯j) if and
only if ∑
j′
(2φij′(p¯)− (µj
′
j + µ¯
j′
j )) · (µj
′
j − µ¯j
′
j ) > 0.
Therefore there exists τ > 0 such that µj ∈ Vi(p¯, µ¯j) for all j ∈ Mj(p¯, a¯, aj)
because∑
j′
(2φij′(p¯)− (µj
′
j + µ¯
j′
j )) · (µj
′
j − µ¯j
′
j ) = 2τ
∑
j′
(φij′(p¯)− µ¯j
′
j ) · (yj′ − y¯j′)
−τ 2
∑
j′
∥∥∥∥(yj′ − y¯j′)−
∑
j′′(yj′′ − y¯j′′) · e
`n
e
∥∥∥∥2 .
Hence if Qρj (p¯, a¯) 6= ∅, then W ρj (p¯, µ¯) 6= ∅. Thus if (µ¯, p¯, x¯, a¯) is an artificial
equilibrium, then (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE.
Q.E.D.
The min{q/(q + 1), (n− 1)/n} = (n− 1)/n part
If (µ¯, p¯, x¯, a¯) is an artificial equilibrium, then µ¯j is in the set co{φi(p¯)}i∈Mδ 6=0
for all j. The set co{φi(p¯)}i∈Mδ 6=0 has dimension n − 1 or less. Indeed
µ ∈ co{φi(p)}i∈Mδ 6=0 if and only if there exists λ ∈ Γ(Mδ 6=0) such that
µ =
 λ1p...
λnp
 .
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Assume ρ ≥ (n− 1)/n. Then ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M) is non-empty according to the
proof of Theorem 2 in Greenberg (1979). For any λj ∈ ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M), let the
function ψj : S → Λ`n−1 be defined by
ψj(p) =
 λ
j
1p
...
λjnp
 .
Then ψj(p) ∈ ∩M∈Iρj co{φi(p)}i∈M for all p. Therefore W
ρ
j (p, ψ
j(p)) = ∅ for
all p. Hence (F”) is satisfied for all p ∈ S.
For p and a−j the problem of firm j is
max
aj
∑
j′
ψjj′(p) · fj′(aj, a−j)
s.t. aj ∈ Aj.
It follows from Berge’s maximum theorem that the solution correspondence
αj : S × A−j → Aj of firm j is upper hemi-continuous and convex valued.
For p and a the truncated problem of consumer i is
max
xi
ui(xi)
s.t.
 p · xi ≤ p · ωi +
∑
j
δijfj(a)
xi ∈ XT .
It follows from Berge’s maximum theorem that the demand correspondence
βi : S × A→ XT is upper hemi-continuous and convex valued.
For x and a the price problem is
max
p
p ·
(∑
i
xi −
∑
i
ωi −
∑
j
fj(a)
)
s.t. p ∈ S.
It follows from Berge’s maximum theorem that the price correspondence
γ : (XT )m × A→ S is upper hemi-continuous and convex valued.
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Let the correspondence g : S × (XT )m ×A→ S × (XT )m ×A be defined
by
g(p, x, a) = (γ(x, a), β1(p, a), . . . , βm(p, a), α1(p, a−1), . . . , αn(p, a−n)).
It follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem that the correspondence has
a fixed point (p¯, x¯, a¯). Clearly, (µ¯, p¯, x¯, a¯), where µ¯ = (ψ1(p¯), . . . , ψn(p¯)), is
an artificial equilibrium so (p¯, x¯, a¯) is a ρ-MSE according to Lemma 1.
3.4 Indeterminacy of equilibria
From the proof of Theorem 2 it follows that the outcome of maximizing a
weighted sum of profits for weights in the intersection of the convex hulls of
portfolios of decisive coalitions ∩MΓ(M) corresponds to voting.
Corollary 2 Consider an economy.
• Suppose ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M) 6= ∅ for all j. Then for every (λ1, . . . , λn) with
λj ∈ ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M) for all j there exists a ρ-majority stable equilibrium
(p¯, x¯, a¯), where a¯j maximizes
∑
j′ λ
j
j′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j) for all j, for the
shareholder governance.
• Suppose ∩M∈IρΓ(M) 6= ∅. Then for every (λ1, . . . , λn) with λj ∈
∩M∈IρΓ(M) for all j there exists a ρ-majority stable equilibrium (p¯, x¯, a¯),
where a¯j maximizes
∑
j′ λ
j
j′ p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j) for all j, for the stakeholder
democracy.
• Suppose ∩M∈IρΓ(M) 6= ∅. Then for every λ ∈ ∩M∈IρΓ(M) there ex-
ists a strong ρ-majority stable equilibrium (p¯, x¯, a¯), where a¯ maximizes∑
j′ λj′ p¯ · fj′(a), for the stakeholder democracy.
According to Corollary 2 for all weights in the intersections of the convex
hulls of normalized portfolios of decisive coalitions there exist equilibria where
firms maximize weighted sums of profits for these weights. Suppose that for
some firm j the intersection of the convex hulls of normalized portfolios of
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decisive coalitions contains more than one weight. Then there is a continuum
of weights in the intersection of the convex hulls of normalized portfolios of
decisive coalitions. Moreover, for the same firm j suppose that the actions
maximizing weighted sums of profits vary with the weights. Then there is
indeterminacy of equilibria because there is a continuum of equilibria.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 2 if ρ ≥ (n−1)/n, then ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M) 6= ∅
for all j and ∩M∈IρΓ(M) 6= ∅. However depending on the distribution of
portfolios ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M) 6= ∅ for all j and ∩M∈IρΓ(M) 6= ∅ is possible for lower
values of ρ. Therefore Corollary 2 rests on assumptions on ∩M∈Iρj Γ(M) and
∩M∈IρΓ(M) rather than assumptions on ρ.
Corollary 2 is a kind of converse to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. On
the one hand the results in Corollary 2 and Corollary 1 are converses, but
Corollary 1 rests on stronger assumptions than Corollary 2. On the other
hand the result in Theorem 1 is weaker than the converse of Corollary 2, but
Corollary 2 and Theorem 1 rest on identical assumptions.
3.5 Internalization in equilibrium
Consider a ρ-MSE or a strong ρ-MSE (p¯, x¯, a¯). Then actions are outcomes
of voting in firms, but they can be viewed as solutions to firms maximizing
weighted sums of profits as shown in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Therefore it
is natural to consider the extreme cases of no internalization and perfect in-
ternalization as solutions to problems of maximizing weighted sums of profits
for different weights.
There is no internalization in case actions in firms corresponds to firms
not taking externalities into account. Hence the action of every firm is a
solution to the problem of maximzing its profit
max
aj
p¯ · fj(aj, a¯−j)
s.t. aj ∈ Aj.
Typically the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal.
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There is perfect internalization in case actions in firms corresponds to
firms taking externalities into account. Hence the action of every firm is a
solution to the problem of maximizing aggregate profit
max
aj
∑
j′
p¯ · fj′(aj, a¯−j)
s.t. aj ∈ Aj.
If the sets of actions are convex and the production functions are concave,
then the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
Perfect internalization is possible in equilibrium if the normalized market
portfolio (1/n)en is in the convex hull of the normalized portfolios of every
decisive coalition.
Theorem 3 Consider an economy.
• Suppose
1
n
en ∈
⋂
j
⋂
M∈Iρj
Γ(M).
Then for the shareholder governance there exist ρ-majority stable equi-
libria with perfect internalization.
• Suppose
1
n
en ∈
⋂
M∈Iρ
Γ(M).
Then for the stakeholder democracy there exist both ρ-majority stable
equilibria and strong ρ-majority stable equilibria with perfect internal-
ization.
Proof: For the shareholder governance assume
1
n
en ∈
⋂
j
⋂
M∈Iρj
Γ(M).
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Then
1
n
 p...
p
 ∈ ⋂
j
⋂
M∈Iρj
co{φi(p)}i∈M
for all p. Therefore it follows from second part of proof of Theorem 2 that
there exists a ρ-MSE with perfect internalization.
The proofs for the stakeholder democracy are identical to the proof for
the shareholder governance.
Q.E.D.
4 Concluding remarks
In the present paper we have studied general equilibrium economies with
perfectly competitive markets and direct externalities between firms. Actions
in firms are decided by majority voting. Since there are externalities between
firms, shareholders typically do not agree on objectives of firms: they want
firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits.
We found that: (1) voting is equivalent to maximizing weigted sums of
profits for weights in the intersection of the convex hulls of portfolios of
majorities of voters; (2) ρ-majority stable equilibria exist in case the rate of
majority is at least min{q/(q+1), (n−1)/n}, where n is the number of firms
and q is the dimension of the set of actions; and, (3) an efficient outcome can
be the outcome of voting in case the market portfolio is in the convex hull
of portfolios of majorities of voters. Moreover two governances, namely the
shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy
(one stakeholder, one vote) were compared. The outcome of the production
sector is more likely to be productively efficient for the stakeholder democracy
than for shareholder governance.
In relation to (2), it is possible to lower the rate of majority needed to
ensure existence of ρ-MSEs. Assume the distribution of portfolios is sym-
metric around the diagonal (the line going through the zero portfolio and
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the market portfolio). Symmetric distributions of portfolios correspond to
no wealth effects in portfolios: the relative distribution of shares does not
depend on the amount of shares. Then for the stakeholder democracy there
exist ρ-MSEs and strong ρ-MSEs for the rate of simple majority ρ = 0.5.
Indeed according to Grandmont (1978) and the second part of the proof of
Theorem 2 the mean portfolio is stable in the sense that actions, which max-
imize a weighted sum of profits with the mean portfolio as weights, are stable
for the rate of simple majority ρ = 0.5.
In relation to (3), since the mean portfolio is the market portfolio for the
stakeholder democracy, there exist ρ-MSEs with perfect internalization for
symmetric distributions of portfolios for ρ = 0.5. However for the shareholder
governance the mean portfolio in firm j is
∑
i δijδi which typically is not
the market portfolio. Therefore ρ-MSEs with perfect internalization need
not exist. Actually, since the distribution of portfolios for firm j need not
be symmetric for voting weights θij = δij, ρ-MSEs need not exist for the
shareholder governance, unless the rate of majority is increased to (n−1)/n.
In relation to (2) it is shown in Caplin & Nalebuff (1991) that ρ-MSEs
exist for rates of majority lower than 64 percent. It would be a useful exercise
to substitute our framework with a finite number of agents with their frame-
work with a continuum of agents. Very interestingly, in Caplin & Nalebuff
(1991) it is shown that the mean portfolio is a ρ-MSE. In relation to (3),
once again, for the stakeholder democracy the mean portfolio is the market
portfolio so there exist ρ-MSEs with perfect internalization. However, for
the shareholder governance the mean portfolio is typically not the market
portfolio so ρ-MSEs with perfect internalization need not exist.
We therefore conjecture that internalization is more likely to be the out-
come of voting for the stakeholder democracy than for the shareholder gov-
ernance.
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